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Why Do Employers Pay for College? 
 
Introduction: 
The tuition assistance that employers provide for their employees who pursue post-
secondary education is a ubiquitous and crucial element in the resources that support students. It 
is not obvious why employers provide such support, however, because post-secondary education 
represents perhaps the classic example of a “general skill” that raises market wages. The analysis 
below examines why employers provide support for the education of their employees and may 
shed some light on the more basic question as to why employers invest in the general skills of 
their employees.   
 
The Nature of Employer Support: 
A range of evidence suggests that employer assistance represents a central part of the 
portfolio of resources that pay for post-secondary education.  The American Council of 
Education estimates, for example, that roughly 20 percent of graduate students are receiving 
some financial assistance from their employer to attend school (cited in Babson 1999), and 
roughly 6 percent of the much bigger pool of all undergraduates receive such aid as well (Lee 
and Clery 1999).  As many as one-third of undergraduates in fields like business and engineering 
receive financial assistance from their employers.  If one looks only at adult students, who are 
more likely to be employed when they are in school and therefore have the possibility of 
receiving aid from employers, data from the National Center on Educational Statistics’ Adult 
Education Survey found that 24 percent of adults in post-secondary education programs of the 
kind that offered credentials (e.g., degrees or certificates) were receiving tuition assistance from 
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an employer, and 53 percent were either receiving tuition support or paid time off from work 
(Hudson 2001).   The Bureau of the Census estimates that financial assistance from employers is 
the most common source of financial aid.  The average level of employer-provided assistance per 
recipient was equal to about one-third of the average annual cost paid by post-secondary students 
(Bureau of the Census, 1994).2 
The extent to which employers provide assistance can be measured more directly from 
surveys of employers, and those results suggests that employer-provided support is ubiquitous.  
For example, a 1992 survey by Coopers and Lybrand of 209 employers found 86 percent 
offering tuition reimbursement plans (BNA 1992a); a 1993 Hewitt Associates survey of 858 
employers also found 99 percent using tuition reimbursement and about 6.5 percent of all 
employees in those firms taking them up at any point in time (Hewett Associates 1993); another 
survey the same year of 335 companies reports that while most companies offered tuition 
reimbursement, 93 percent went further and offered other types of financial assistance for 
education as well as tuition (IFEBP 1993).  A more recent 2002 survey by the Society for Human 
Resource Management of 510 employers found a somewhat lower number, 79 percent offering 
educational assistance of various kinds (SHRM 2002).  These surveys are based on samples of 
convenience and of very large employers, however, and therefore may not accurately represent 
the true level of participation among all employers. The data used here (see below) will report 
levels somewhat below these estimates but still suggest that a substantial majority of employers 
offer such plans.  Whichever figures one uses, it is clear that most employers do help pay for 
their employees to receive post-secondary education.   
                                                          
2 A calculation of tuition assistance as a proportion of total post-secondary expenses must be somewhat 
indirect: Census calculates that half of all students (including, of course, those who are not working) 
receive some aid and one-third of students who received aid got some from their employer. Therefore, 
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This conclusion is interesting because it is something of a surprise that any employers 
should offer such support, let alone that most employers do.  Post-secondary education 
represents the classic example of the type of investments in employees that we would not expect 
employers to make because the skills and knowledge it produces are general skills useful to other 
employers.  As Becker (1964) first made clear, the benefits of such general skills flow to the 
employees who possess them and not to the employers who provided them:  Because these 
general skills are useful elsewhere, the current employer has to pay the market wage for 
employees who have them or risk losing those workers to competitors who will pay that market 
wage.  The employer who pays for the cost of general skills training would then also have to pay 
the employee a higher wage equal to the improvement in marginal product that such training 
generated, making it difficult or impossible to recoup that investment.  The skills provided 
through post-secondary education are arguably the most general as they enhance many basic 
skills, such as communications and analytic skills, which are broadly useful. Even occupationally 
specialized programs, such as nursing or computer programming, are valuable to a great many 
employers. Course work tends to be reasonably standardized, and transcripts certifying 
knowledge of at least some level of the material being taught are readily available to potential 
employers.   
There are clearly variations in the level and type of support that employers provide to 
their student employees, but the main type of support is tuition assistance to pay some or all of 
the direct costs of coursework.  Surveys of employers who offer such plans find that, while there 
is considerable variation across plans, the benefits are not trivial and are often quite generous.3 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
roughly 17 percent of all students received employer assistance.   If employers paid one-third of the costs 
for these students, then they are paying about 5 to 6 percent of all post-secondary expenditures.  
3  77 percent of employers pay expenses beyond tuition (seven percent even pay for parking), and 72 
percent have no limit on the number of courses that employees can take (Hewitt 1998).  The average 
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Even where the skills being acquired are useful in current jobs, the benefits associated with the 
employee’s increased marginal productivity should flow to the employee as long as those skills 
are general and useful elsewhere.  Nor is it the case that employers who need certain general 
skills in their workforce have to send their current employees to college to get them. The obvious 
alternative is simply to hire employees who already have those skills.  The employer has to pay 
the market wage for general skills when they hire such workers, but at least they do not have to 
pay for the skills and pay the market wage as they presumably do when they provide tuition 
assistance for current employees.   So the question remains, why do employers do it?4  
 
Why Employers Support General Skills: 
Evidence from employee surveys suggests that most training may be general in the broad 
sense of being useful elsewhere (Barron, Berger, and Black 1999).  There is now a large 
literature attempting to explain why employers in fact provide general skills training of all kinds, 
and some of those explanations may apply to employer support for post-secondary education as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
employer payment through tuition assistance plans is $3906 per year while the modal payment is $5,000 
(IFEBP 2002). Eighty percent of employers in this same survey allow their employees to take any courses 
regardless of subject matter or eventual degree, therefore in some cases paying for skills that have no 
benefit to them.  The others restrict the content in various ways, typically to programs and courses that 
have some relevance to the company and the employee’s work there.  Such restrictions make it more 
likely that the skills the employees acquire will be of some use to the employer.   
4  Perhaps the simplest explanation might be that tuition assistance is just a tax-free benefit that employers 
offer as a form of cost-effective compensation. Employee payments for their own tuition are only tax 
deductible under limited circumstances (i.e., for coursework directly related to their job), but employers 
can provide their employees with up to $5250 toward tuition costs without the employees having to pay 
income tax on those benefits. Similarly, the employers can avoid paying FICA contributions on those 
payments that they would otherwise have to pay on compensation, arrangements known as Section 127 
Benefits. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 kept all undergraduate tuition reimbursements tax exempt to 
recipients but made graduate reimbursements taxable unless they were for courses related to work, a 
criterion that has been interpreted broadly.  But any utility in terms of additional compensation for the 
workforce would be greater for other employee benefits that are used by more employees, such as 
expanded healthcare.  So it is not at all obvious why employers who were motivated to offer tax-free 
compensation would choose this benefit as opposed to others. 
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well.  Ultimately, employers have to recoup the investment in training through a gap between 
what workers produce and what they are paid.  The question is how that happens.   
Among the possible explanations is the argument put forward by Katz and Ziderman 
(1990) suggesting that, in practice, information about general skills provided by one’s employer 
is not readily available to other employers.  While such skills may be valuable to other 
employers, if they cannot be easily identified by other employers, then other job offers will not 
be forthcoming. Employers can therefore provide general skills training because those skills will 
raise the productivity but not the marketability and wages of their employees. 
 This explanation does not seem to apply to post-secondary education, however, because 
such education creates general skills that are easily identifiable in the market place. Indeed, 
education is probably the most readily identifiable credential for skills because it is widely 
recognized not only by employers but by virtually everyone.  The credentials are issued by 
independent organizations, typically by colleges and universities, which are certified in various 
ways to ensure that the skills being taught conformed to standardized criteria. Indeed, post-
secondary institutions sometimes compete with each other on their ability to raise the wages of 
their students, and the relatively higher wages of those who attend college (especially for those 
who graduate, given that degrees represent the clearest signal of skills to the market) is one of the 
most important stylized facts in the labor market.  So it seems unlikely that the decision to help 
pay for the education of employees can be explained by asserting that the skills provided cannot 
be observed in the market.    
Arguably the best-known explanation for funding general skills training and the one 
outlined by Becker is to have the employees pay for it explicitly by accepting “training” wages 
that are below their marginal product, and typically below the market wage, while they are being 
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trained.  Apprenticeship-type arrangements are the best example, and there are many descriptions 
of similar arrangements (see, e.g., Leuvan, 1999).   
Other studies have shown that workers receiving general skills training do not necessarily 
receive lower training wages (see Bishop 1996; Baron, Berger, and Black 1997), however, and 
there are reasons for believing that training wages are unlikely to be the explanation for tuition 
assistance. There are no arrangements with which I am familiar in companies to hold down or 
reduce wages explicitly while employees are receiving tuition benefits as there are with tuition 
programs.5  So the question would be whether tuition benefits are used at a point where wages 
are otherwise held below their productivity, such as at the beginning of their career as many 
models assume (whether there is evidence that wages are in fact below marginal products then is, 
of course, a separate empirical question).   
There are at least two reasons for thinking that this is not the mechanism that funds 
tuition assistance.  First, most employers prohibit access to tuition benefits for new hires, when 
one would think of the employees as being “trainees” who are still learning their jobs.  Fifty-
seven percent make employees wait a year or more of service before they can receive such 
benefits (IFEBP 2002).  That may not seem like a significant delay, but it is important to 
remember that most employees do not stay long with a given employer: Over the past twenty 
years, one in five employees had tenure of less than one year (Jaeger and Stevens, 2000), and 
forty-five percent stay four years or less (Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen 2000). 
Second and most important, once employees are eligible for these programs, with few 
exceptions (e.g., approval required for certain courses) the employees themselves decide when to 
                                                          
5 I put this question to a group of 41 human resource managers at the 2002 Society for Human Resource 
Management (SHRM) Annual Conference program on business strategy (June 22 2002).  None of their 
companies had any arrangements where it was possible to explicitly lower the wages of workers using 
TAPs,, and none had heard of any arrangement like those elsewhere.  
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use the benefits.  The typical model of tuition assistance, where employers pay some or all of the 
tuition costs and employees attend classes on their own time, cannot be used for employer-
mandated training because of various legislative restrictions governing training and tuition 
assistance. (If the training is required and the employer mandates it, then the employer must pay 
the full cost of the training, provide it during working hours, and pay non-exempt workers their 
full wage while receiving the training.  See footnote 14.) After meeting the minimum tenure 
requirements, employees can use tuition assistance whenever they want.  So the question is 
whether employees voluntarily and systematically happen to use them at points when we might 
believe wages are otherwise held down.  Back-loaded models of compensation assert that this 
period would be at the beginning of their career.   
There are no systematic data on tenure and use of tuition plans, but I investigated through 
contacts with human resource departments the pattern of usage at several organizations.  These 
may be representative of arrangements in the population.  At my University, for example, the 
benefits office reports that the average employee who uses tuition benefits for their own 
education has five years of tenure while the average tenure for all employees is nine years.  
United Technologies reports that their average tuition benefit recipient has five years with the 
company; average tenure there is closer to 15 years.  Xerox Copier Division says that their 
average user is over 30 years of age while the average worker in the Division is closer to 40.  
Harleysville Insurance, which has a remarkable 30 percent of all employees currently using 
tuition assistance, reports that the distribution of usage by tenure and age is roughly 
proportionate to that of the workforce as a whole.  All of these organizations note that there is a 
wide distribution of use by age and tenure levels – some of the oldest and most senior employees 
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use them as well.  And employees seeking degrees may use the plans for many years, given that 
they are by definition attending school part time and may be seeking degrees.   
Tuition assistance users may be somewhat younger and less senior than the workforce as 
a whole, but they are not new hires, and many senior workers use them as well.  Further, the data 
presented earlier suggests that only a fraction of the workforce is using these benefits at any 
point in time.  It is extremely difficult to imagine any wage structure that would hold down 
wages selectively for workers who use these plans without holding down effectively most of the 
wages for the firm.  It might be, of course, that employers who use these plans systematically 
have below-market wages, a possibility that is examined below.  
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) put forward a different explanation, that workers pay for 
general skills after the fact by having marginal products that exceed their wages.  Their 
explanation relies on compressed wage structures where wages for higher skilled workers are 
artificially held down relative to their own marginal products.  Market imperfections in various 
forms could prevent wages from rising and make it possible for the employers to recoup tuition 
investments by having worker productivity exceed their wages.  Given that tuition assistance 
programs operate so broadly across the economy and that employees use them at any point in 
their career, it seems unlikely that market imperfections as one usually thinks of them (e.g., 
collective bargaining agreements) would explain their wide-spread use.  One type of market 
imperfection, imperfect information, may be a promising explanation for the use of tuition 
assistance in that it could be wide-spread enough to explain the results.     
Specifically, tuition assistance may create private information by sorting out 
heterogeneity and information asymmetries among job applicants.  We know that applicants who 
are interested in being trained may be systematically better workers in ways that are useful to the 
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employers as compared to employees who do not have that interest.  Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1998) and Autor (2001) provide evidence that firms offering general skills training do attract 
better quality workers and argue explicitly that self-selection mechanisms are part of the story. 
Employers who offer training may therefore have an advantage in recruiting over those who do 
not because better quality applicants self-select to apply for those jobs (Stevens 1994).   
Self-selection seems especially applicable to tuition assistance because the general skills 
provided by post-secondary education are the ones that employees understand will benefit them 
most.  Poorer-quality applicants who lack the ability, discipline, or motivation to take succeed in 
post-secondary education will see no advantage from taking jobs with such a benefit (unlike 
most employer-provided general skills training, it is possible to fail post-secondary courses). And 
unlike most other employee benefits, employees must share in the costs of using tuition 
assistance through an investment of their time and effort, typically outside of work hours, as well 
as some of the financial costs (few plans pay the entire cost of tuition, fees, books, etc.).  So the 
usual requirement of signaling models, that there be a “separating equilibrium” whereby it is 
easier or more desirable for high ability applicants to signal their ability, seems to apply here.  A 
lower initial or “training” wage as in other models of general training may not be needed to 
dissuade lower ability workers from applying.  
Uncovering better quality workers could allow firms to earn a return if the information 
about the superior abilities of those workers is not publicly available: Their market wage does 
not rise if the information is not readily available even though their marginal product is higher.6  
                                                          
6 It is possible that merely being hired at a firm that offers tuition assistance could send a signal to other 
employers that one is a better worker.  But quitting that first firm to take advantage of offers from other 
firms could also send a negative signal about one’s capabilities (e.g., that the employee had problems at 
work) that makes them less attractive.  As Greenwald (1986) observed, the fact that the first employer 
knows who is a good worker, presumably keeping the good ones and firing the poor ones, generates 
adverse selection in the outside or second-hand market.  
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If their productivity is above market levels, employers could earn a margin on them even while 
paying the market wage.   Employers may even have an incentive for rent sharing, raising wages 
somewhat above the market rate, in order to induce these good workers to stay with the firm.  
Turnover should be lower as well where employees use tuition assistance.  Part of the 
explanation is obvious: As noted above, many employers require that employees be with the firm 
for some period before they receive tuition assistance.  A smaller percentage require employees 
to sign contracts that make them reimburse the costs of the tuition benefits should they quit 
before some specific date.  About 20 percent of U.S. employers have such requirements, and the 
average length of stay required is six months (IFEBP 2002).  The requirement across the 
population of all employers who offer tuition assistance, therefore, would average out to roughly 
36 days.  Together these arrangements no doubt have some effect on increasing average tenure 
and reducing turnover. 
The more important explanation for lower turnover is what one might label an “efficiency 
wage” mechanism: Employees stay with the firm longer because they want to keep using the 
tuition assistance benefit to complete their education, a process that could take many years.  
Receiving a post-secondary education is a time-consuming process, especially if one is going to 
school while working. The shortest course that is typically possible, a single semester class of 
roughly 14 weeks, is more than double the 36 day requirement noted above, and the coursework 
required for even an Associate’s Degree could easily exceed the tenure of the average employee.  
If employees who use tuition assistance are tied to their firms during the period when they are 
using the plans, then employers are able to hold down wages somewhat during that period, at 
least relative to worker’s marginal productivity.  And the common requirement to serve some 
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period of time before tuition assistance can be used prevents employees from finishing their 
education by jumping to a competitor.  
A related possibility is that firms that offer tuition benefits and the workers who select 
into them are distinctive in ways that create better matches between jobs and workers.  A good fit 
or “match” between distinctive jobs and distinctive workers leads to higher performance without 
necessarily raising market wages because the match is not transferable elsewhere. Employers 
have an incentive to share some of the rents generated by this better performance in order to help 
retain the good matches, so wages rise above market levels and turnover falls as a result 
(Jovanovic 1979; see also Bowlus 1995 for wage effects and Hersch and Reagan 1990 and 
Simon and Warner 1992 for tenure effects).  Empirical models of match quality have fallen 
somewhat out of favor, however, because it is difficult to identify the mechanisms through which 
superior matches would take place and essentially impossible with most data to examine the 
quality of matches per se.  And the predictions of higher wages and lower turnover are often 
consistent with other models.  In this case, the selection/efficiency wage argument above is 
simpler and makes the same predictions. While we cannot explore the match quality hypothesis 
explicitly, it is worth bearing in mind that it could present an alternative interpretation for the 
analyses below.   
  
A Simple Theoretical Model of Tuition Assistance: 
In the model below, workers who have greater ability and motivation self-select into 
firms with tuition assistance plans.  Their marginal productivity, other things equal, is above 
average levels in the market.  Information about their superior ability is at least not immediately 
or perfectly available to other firms (the signal comes when they actually begin using tuition 
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assistance), and so their market wage does not rise to the level of their marginal productivity.  
Because their productivity is above market levels, employers can pay them the market wage and 
still earn a margin on their performance.  (The workers might have been willing to accept wages 
below market levels in return for tuition benefits, but the fact that employers are earning a return 
on the workers even at market levels sufficient to fund the tuition benefits combined with labor 
market competition among employers pushes the wages higher.)  The employees who receive 
tuition assistance are tied to the firm for many years.  In part requirements of the tuition 
assistance plans may tie them there, but mainly they stay in order to make use of the benefits and 
receive their education, a process that can take years.  Once they finish their education, their 
market wage rises to reflect the level of their new general skills and their greater ability and 
motivation as signaled by essentially working their way through school using tuition assistance.  
At that point, their market wage rises to their true marginal productivity, and the employer no 
longer earns a return that could be used to pay off the tuition benefits.    
Consider the match between a firm and its employees where one looks at match quality 
from the perspective of the firm, instead of the usual focus at the individual level, where the 
concern is with the average quality of matches across the workforce.  
The match quality m depends on a firm’s general recruiting and work practices and on its 
educational policy, including tuition reimbursement for general skills training in the form of 
post-secondary education. Let t denote tuition reimbursement for employees, and i denote the 
combination of all other characteristics of a firm that affect its overall match quality. It is 
assumed that the two partial derivatives of m(t,i): mt(t,i), mi(t,i), and the cross second derivative 
mti(t,i) are all positive. 
 14
Because i defines many of the attributes of a firm, it no doubt has an important influence 
on recruiting and on the average match quality of its employees. Tuition reimbursement 
encourages employees to increase their stock of general skills and of human capital more 
broadly, which increases their ability to perform better on the job. At least some part of the cost 
of acquiring those general skills is borne by the student/employee through time and effort spent 
learning outside of working hours.  Assume also that firm-specific skills are seen as compliments 
to general skills and that higher levels of general skills induce the firm to invest more in specific 
training.  The more crucial the human resources are to a firm’s success, the bigger the influence 
that tuition reimbursement will have on the firm’s overall productivity. 
Let h0 be an employee’s initial human capital when joining the firm. The tuition 
reimbursement encourages the employee to increases his/her human capital to h= h0 + t. Suppose 
all competing firms have the same technology represented by a production function f(h) without 
loss of generality. We index each firm by its characteristics i so that firm i’s production function 
is m(t,i)f(h). The wage rate is denoted by wi . The objective function of a firm i is 
(1)   max m(t,i)f(h) – wi h – c (t) 
with respect to t, taking other parameters as given. Here c (t) is the cost of tuition reimbursement. 
 
The first order condition about t is 
(2)   mt(t,i)f(h)+ m(t,i)f’(h) - wi  – c’ (t) < 0 if t=0; 
        mt(t,i)f(h)+ m(t,i)f’(h) - wi  – c’ (t) = 0 if t>0; 
It is not difficult to see that a firm with a higher i is more likely to reimburse tuition for its 
employees under reasonable assumptions. 
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Instead of providing tuition reimbursement to encourage employees to increase their 
human capital, a firm could hire a new employee with the same level of human capital, say, the 
same as h= h0 + t and dismiss the original employee with h0. Suppose the cost of doing so is r. 
The profit level of a firm i in this situation is  
(3)    m(0,i)f(h) – wm h – r, 
where wm is the market wage. By the first order condition of optimization with respect to h, we 
have the following condition held, 
(4)    wm = m(0,i)f’(h). 
 
Firm i compares these two schemes -- tuition assistance to improve the human capital of current 
employees v. hiring new employees.  The firm chooses the more profitable one to implement. 
Let D denote the difference of the two levels of profit,  
(5)   D = m(t,i)f(h) –  wi h – c (t) –[ m(0,i)f(h) – wm h – r] 
=[ m(t,i)f(h)– m(0,i)f(h)] –  (wi h – wm h)– (c (t) – r) 
 
The wage rate wm is also the one faced by employees in firm i if they choose to quit after taking 
the tuition reimbursement. To prevent quitting, the wage rate wi should be higher or equal to wm 
.This means the wage rate for current employee should be at least equal to or greater than that for 
a new hire with the same human capital level. The reason here is that current employees have 
accumulated some firm-specific human capital than the new hires. 
It is easy to see that if the gain in productivity m(t,i)f(h)– m(0,i)f(h) is high enough such 
than the cost c (t) – r, which is true with appropriate parameters, then D > 0 so that the firm will 
choose to provide educational support to current employees instead of hiring new ones. And the 
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wage rate in this case is not lower than the market rate. Accordingly the turnover rate should be 
lower because employees have no incentive to quit. Further, the rate of involuntary turnover is 
also lower because firms do not need to layoff current employees and hire new ones. The 
comparative statics show that D increases with the initial human capital h0 , which implies a 
positive correlation between h0 and tuition reimbursement t. 
 We can examine the extent to which tuition assistance programs affect the ability to hire 
better workers as well as employee outcomes that are seen as indicating the presence of better 
matches.    
  
The Data: 
The ideal data for this study would be longitudinal data on individuals who use tuition 
assistance that includes their wages and their marginal productivity in order to measure the 
margin between the two before and using tuition assistance.  Such data would have to include 
controls for employer characteristics and practices, and marginal productivity data has to be 
measured at the firm.  No such data exist – there are not even any individual-level data on the use 
of tuition assistance.  What we do have is data about employers, their use of tuition assistance 
and other practices, and average characteristics of their workforce including wages.  The 
National Employer Survey II administered by the U.S. Bureau of the Census provides such 
information.  The survey was conducted in August of 1997 (NES II) via Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing (CATI). The sampling frame was drawn from the Standard Statistical 
Establishment List, arguably the most comprehensive list of establishments available. Public 
sector employees, not-for-profit institutions, and corporate headquarters were excluded from the 
sample. Although the survey excluded establishments with less than 20 employees (which 
 17
represent approximately 85 percent of all establishments in the U.S.), the sampling frame 
represents establishments that employ approximately 75 percent of all workers (because most 
workers are employed in larger establishments). The survey over-sampled the nation's largest 
establishments and those in the manufacturing sector. Weights were constructed for the data by 
the Census to approximate the true distribution of establishments (by size and industry) in the 
economy. The target respondent in the manufacturing sector was the plant manager and the local 
business site manager in the non-manufacturing sector. 
The sample for the NES II Public Use File used here has approximately 3,000 completed 
interviews that comprise a representative sample of the United States. The usual reason given by 
employers as to why they would not participate in the survey was that they did not participate in 
any voluntary surveys or were too busy to participate.  Probit analysis conducted by Lynch and 
Black (1995) of the characteristics of nonrespondents from the initial NES survey in 1994, a 
similar sampling frame, indicates that there was no significant pattern at the two-digit industry 
level in the likelihood of participating in the survey. The only differentiating characteristic of 
establishments less likely to participate was that manufacturing establishments with more than 
1000 employees, 0.1 percent of the sample, were less likely to do so.  
The survey asks a series of questions about employer practices with respect to issues like 
recruiting, the terms and conditions of employment, and – most important – whether the 
employer provided tuition assistance.  Many of the questions collect information about practices 
for five separate occupational categories: managers and professionals, supervisors, technicians, 
office/clerical/sales/and customer support, and production workers.  Observations are removed 
from the analysis when data for any variable used in it is missing in order to keep sample sizes 
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the same for all coefficients in the analysis.  As a result, sample sizes tend to fall the more 
variables used and will differ across models.    
Information about tuition assistance comes from the following question, “Do you 
reimburse the cost of tuition for an approved course for a. managers and professionals; 
b.supervisors; c.technical and technical support; d.office, clerical, sales; and e.customer 
service/production workers?”7  No doubt other information about tuition assistance would be 
interesting as well, such as how much assistance the employer provides or what kind of 
restrictions are put on the courses for which reimbursement can be received.  But the basic issues 
concerning tuition reimbursement raised earlier all turn on why employers provide any such 
assistance, not how much they provide or how tightly they restrict it, and those issues can be 
addressed with information from this question. 
Table 1 provides some simple descriptive information about the incidence of tuition 
assistance at the establishment level and how it varies by industry and by the size of the 
establishment.  Perhaps the most remarkable statistic is simply how wide spread tuition 
assistance is, mirroring the results of earlier surveys noted above.  Eight-eight percent of 
establishments say they reimburse tuition for approved courses, a figure roughly in the middle of 
the estimates from earlier ad hoc surveys.  In some industries, the practice seems close to 
universal.  The fact that so few establishments do not provide assistance limits the variance in 
this variable.  Fortunately, the power of statistical tests is based not on the percentage of 
observations that vary, which is small (only 12 percent not providing tuition), but on the absolute 
number in the smallest cell (i.e., the smaller of the “yes” or “no” response), which is relatively 
                                                          
7 The question does not ask about college course work per se, but the issues would be identical if the 
responses included secondary or high school education, which provide equally general skills.  Virtually 
all part-time secondary education is free, including evening schools and General Education Degree 
programs (GED’s), though, and the word “tuition” seems associated with post-secondary programs.  
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large (181 in the survey).  Variables with small cells are not a problem when used as independent 
variables, as used here, as long as they are not collinear with the other predictor variables. 
Table 1 Here 
The other variables used in the analyses that follow include a range of control variables 
based on characteristics of the establishments, such as their industry and size, and characteristics 
of their workforces, as well as information about specific employment practices related to the 
arguments above.  These variables, their means and standard deviations, are provided in Table 2 
and are discussed below in the context of the analyses where they are used. 
Table 2 Here 
Analyses: 
 Before examining the hypotheses outlined above, I consider a simple check on the 
usefulness of the data with respect to the question about tuition reimbursement. Presumably 
tuition reimbursement as an employer policy matters if it causes employees to undertake more 
education than they otherwise would. It is difficult to argue with the conceptual notion that 
reducing the price of education should increase employees’ use of it, although one might imagine 
scenarios where policies of tuition reimbursement may not work (e.g., employers may restrict the 
use of their policies so tightly that the policies have little effect).  The arguments and hypotheses 
presented above, though, are based on the assumption that at least some employees actually use 
these policies to increase their level of education beyond what it otherwise would be. And a 
positive relationship between tuition reimbursement programs and the educational outcomes of 
employees would make us much more sanguine about that assumption as well as about the 
usefulness of the data.    
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It is not obvious from prior research exactly how one should model the relationship 
between tuition assistance and the educational attainment of an employer’s workforce. One 
complication is that tuition assistance may well affect the overall level of education in a 
workforce by attracting applicants who already have more education, an issue examined 
explicitly below.  Indeed, the level of education that workers have when they are hired may be 
the most important component of average education levels in the workforce.  However, we 
would like to examine how tuition assistance affects the educational attainment of current 
employees, that is, whether it leads to additional education after they are hired.8  Fortunately, the 
NES asks employers not only about the average educational level of their workers but also about 
the average educational level of new hires. By examining the relationship between tuition 
assistance programs and average education levels while controlling for the average education of 
new hires, we can get a reasonably accurate sense of whether such assistance affects the 
educational levels of current employees. Because these measures aggregate from the attributes of 
individual employees, it seems reasonable to include demographic characteristics of the 
employees as control variables.  
(6) I estimate an equation of the form:  Edi = α + Tiβ + Xiγ + εi , where  we are estimating 
the causal effect of T, tuition assistance, on average education levels, Ed, and where X 
denotes a vector of factors that may affect educational attainment but are not related to 
the central hypothesis.  The specific variables included as controls in X are industry, 
employment size (by category), manufacturing as a category, the percentage of the 
                                                          
8 The complication here in sorting out heterogeneity associated with recruitment is that policies of tuition 
reimbursement may also attract applicants who are more interested in getting additional education.  Even 
controlling for the level of education of recruits therefore does not completely control for the effects of 
recruitment on total educational attainment.  On the other hand, attracting applicants more interested in 
education would be a crucial outcome of tuition assistance policies. Sorting out how much of the effect is 
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workforce who are women and the percentage who are minorities, the distribution of 
employment by occupational category, and – most importantly – the average educational 
level of new hires.  
The results of simple OLS regressions are reported in Table 3.  The relationship between 
average education levels and tuition assistance programs, other things equal, is positive and 
significant, although the significance declines once controls for industry and employment size 
are added. These results are supportive of the notion that tuition assistance does influence the 
educational level of workers once they are hired.  One could also use these coefficients to 
calculate something about the magnitude of education that workers receive as a result of these 
plans if one had good data on the percentage of workers across establishments who have ever 
used of tuition assistance, information that is unfortunately unavailable.  If we assume that 10 
percent of current employees have used them (the figure at one of the employers discussed 
earlier), then a coefficient of approximately 0.15 implies that those employees who have used the 
plan have on average 1.5 years more education as a result.   
Table 3 Here 
 
Evidence for Selection:  A first step in considering the model described earlier is to see 
whether tuition assistance is associated with hiring more qualified applicants. There may be a 
wide range of attributes associated with better quality applicants, and no doubt it would be 
interesting to explore many of them. But the attribute that has arguably been seen as most 
important, particularly in human capital models, is the educational level of new hires.  Education 
levels may also serve as a proxy for other desirable characteristics, such as persistence and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
due to these inclinations and how much to the reduced cost of education associated with tuition assistance 
plans would go beyond the limits of these data, however.  
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general cognitive ability, that also raise performance.  If applicants with more education are also 
ones with a greater interest in further education, then we might expect tuition assistance plans to 
be especially attractive to such applicants. We test whether the average education of new hires, 
controlling for other characteristics, is higher at establishments that offer tuition assistance with a 
simple model where the average education level of new hires is regressed against the incidence 
of tuition assistance plans:  
(7)  HEdi = α + Triβ + Xiγ + εI    where the average education level of new hires is a 
function of the incidence of tuition assistance plans and a vector of control variables 
which includes the distribution of employment by occupation, the percentage of workers 
who are women and who are minorities, industry, establishment size, manufacturing as a 
category, and, most important, the establishment’s annual expenditures on recruiting new 
employees expressed as a percentage of labor costs.9  Such expenditures are a good 
measure for other efforts that may attract better quality applicants to the establishment.   
OLS results in Table 4 suggest that there is a positive relationship between tuition 
assistance and the education level of new hires. Tuition plans, therefore, may help employers 
attract a more educated and better quality pool of workers.10   
    Table 4 Here 
                                                          
9 In equation 6, it is clearly important to control for new hire education when examining whether the 
average education of current workers is higher because new hire education so clearly influences average 
education.  It is not at all clear how the average education of the workforce should affect the average 
education of new hires, however, except in a spurious sense. 
10 One issue is whether average education levels at each establishment should be included as control 
variables.  While such levels may well send signals affecting who applies at that establishment, the 
empirical problem is that new hire education and average education are endogenous for the reasons noted 
earlier.  One attempt around that problem is to regress average education on new hire education and use 
the residual as an independent variable in a subsequent equation modeling new hire education.  The 
results of that exercise, available on request, lead to positive and relationships with tuition assistance of 
roughly the same size and of greater significance as those reported here. Results by occupation find the 
size of the manager and supervisor coefficients essentially the same as those in Table 4, considerably 
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 Do employees pay for tuition? The next step in the analyses is to examine relationships 
with wages.  The model and evidence above suggests that because more productive workers 
come to establishments that offer tuition assistance and that information about their ability is 
private, employers can earn a margin while paying market wages.  Evidence that wages are at or 
above market levels, other things equal, would be consistent with the view that workers are more 
productive in establishments where tuition assistance is offered. Wages below market levels, on 
the other hand, would be consistent with the most common explanation for general skills 
training, that workers pay for it through below market, training wages.  The test is based on 
examining a simple wage equation of the form:  
(8)  Wi = α + Tiβ + Xiγ + εI  where the intent is to model the relationship between tuition 
assistance T on wages W while controlling for a vector of other factors that may affect wages 
X.  
Control variables include the average education levels of the workforce (aggregated by each 
occupational group), the distribution of employment across those occupational groups, whether 
the establishment’s employees are represented by a union, the industry and size of the 
establishment, the percentage of the workforce who are women, and the percentage who are 
minorities.  Although the data used here are cross-sectional, that would appear to be less of an 
issue than might typically be the case because the hypotheses being considered is not necessarily 
causal:  Independent of which came first, tuition plans or below-market wages, once these plans 
exist, are they paid for by holding wages below market levels?  
The results of this wage equation for establishment wages are presented in Table 5.  Overall, 
the model compares well in terms of explanatory power to a typical individual-level model (a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
greater for clerical workers (.59), and roughly has as big for production workers (.18) and office workers 
(.15).  The relationships for the latter are insignificant.  
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standard human capital wage equation using Current Population Survey data, e.g., explains 
roughly a third of the variance in wages across individual workers).   
Table 5 Here 
The results show a positive and significant relationship between wages and tuition 
reimbursement plans.  Because the model controls for workforce education levels, it is not the 
case that the higher wages can be attributed to the fact that tuition assistance plans raise 
education levels.  The finding of a wage premium associated with tuition assistance plans is 
inconsistent with a model where wages are held below market rates either before, such as 
apprentice or training wage arguments, or after workers received tuition benefits.  Other things 
equal, wages would have to be lower on average if employers were paying for tuition assistance 
by holding wages below market levels (if wages were lower at some point but offset by higher 
wages at another, the employer would have no margin from which to fund tuition assistance).  
The finding is consistent, however, with a model where marginal productivity is higher than 
market wages.  Indeed, above average productivity is required for that result. Exactly why 
employers would set wages above market levels in these firms is something of a puzzle, though, 
not predicted by the model above.  Rent-sharing in order to improve retention and keep morale 
high is one explanation; another is that some of the information about the superior productivity 
of these workers is public and affects their market wages; some omitted variable (e.g., the jobs 
are more demanding) is always a concern as well.  It is impossible to sort out these explanations 
with the data available here.     
A different argument from the prior literature noted earlier makes an explicit assertion 
about the direction of causation in the relationship between wages and tuition assistance. It 
asserts that the presence of compressed wage structures provides the opportunity to introduce 
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and recoup investments in college education by holding down wages after receiving education. 
One needs longitudinal data before and after the introduction of tuition assistance plans for a 
truly accurate test, and the cross-section data available here can at best provide only suggestive 
evidence about that hypothesis.  
In order to identify those situations where wage structures are compressed and below 
market levels, I first calculate the residuals from the wage equation (2) (but in this case 
excluding the tuition assistance variable from that equation) and use them as a measure of the 
extent to which wages are compressed or held below comparable rates elsewhere. Those 
residuals are then used to predict the incidence of tuition assistance plans. Wage residuals make 
it easier to interpret the coefficient as a test of the depressed wage argument.  
(9) I estimate a model of the form:  Ti = α - Wriβ + Xiγ + εI   where the incidence of 
tuition assistance is estimated as a function of average wage residual at that establishment 
when controlling for a vector of other factors X that may affect tuition assistance.    
In addition to controls for industry and size, I also include a measure counting up the 
number of employee benefits offered at each establishment from a standard list of thirteen in the 
NES on the grounds that tuition assistance may operate as another form of employee benefit. 
Union coverage and the average education levels of new hires are included as other factors that 
affect market wages as well as industry, manufacturing as a sector, and average size control 
variables.   
 The results of Probit analyses, also presented in Table 5, indicate that wage residuals are 
positively related to the incidence of employer-provided tuition assistance programs.  Although 
equation 9 is clearly not the same as equation 8, it would have been surprising given the cross-
sectional nature of the data if the results were qualitatively different. Wages below prevailing 
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levels at other employers do not seem to be driving the use of tuition reimbursement plans.  In 
fact, the opposite appears to be true: Higher wages seem to be associated with the incidence of 
these plans.11 
One issue with establishment-level data such as these concerns the possibility of 
weighting the observations in the analyses based on their probability of appearing in the sample. 
OLS inconsistency can arise if the probability that a given observation in the population is 
included in the sample is related to the dependent variable such that the expected value of the 
product of the independent variables and the error term (conditional on being included in the 
sample p) is not equal to zero.  That probability is interpreted as the inverse of the weight 
associated with that observation. WLS is a common choice if OLS is not consistent. But the 
drawback to WLS is that it can have a high variance due to the large variation in weights, 
variation that may have nothing to do with the bias in OLS. In this situation, the weights were 
generated by Census to make the data more representative of the population of all establishments 
and vary by industry and size of establishment.  Because establishment employment in particular 
ranges from 20 to over 5000, the weights may have a large variation.  
Hausman tests between OLS and WLS are performed on the results outlined below as an 
initial test of the consistency of OLS.  For the OLS results presented in Tables 3 and 5, the 
coefficients of OLS and WLS are virtually identical. In Table 4, the differences between the two 
are significant. But this difference might be the result of the large variance in WLS rather than 
                                                          
11 The coefficients by occupation are essentially the same in terms of magnitude for (ln) wages as that in 
Table 5 but were insignificant for managers.  For the equation with wage residuals, the coefficient was 
virtually twice as large (1.33) for production workers and roughly half as large (.27) for supervisors.  For 
coefficients were roughly similar for managers (.52), office workers (.78), and technicians but were 
insignificant for supervisors and technicians.   The residual equation is the only one in the analyses here 
where tuition assistance is the dependent variable and where the small percent of “yes” responses might 
conceivably affect the analysis.  But because there are a relatively large number of such responses (117) 
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the bias of OLS. The 2STEP method proposed by Magee et al. (1998) is designed to address this 
situation and is used here. The results, presented in the Appendix, show that the 2STEP 
coefficients of interests are almost the same as the OLS in the sense that they have the same sign 
and significant levels. Thus, the unweighted results presented here seem appropriate.  (There is 
no corresponding method for assessing the appropriateness of weights for logit and Tobit 
regressions, although the 2STEP above when applied to those regressions also suggests no 
difference between the weighted and unweighted results.) 
 Tests of Employee Turnover:  The next test is to see whether these plans are associated 
with lower levels of employee turnover, the proxy here for tenure.  Turnover and employee 
tenure are not the same, of course.  Average tenure can be affected by hiring rates as well as by 
employee quits (including retirements) and dismissals/layoffs.  Quits and dismissals are the 
mechanisms behind turnover.  They are also the mechanisms associated with the model above 
where both quits and dismissals should be lower where better quality workers self-select and stay 
with the firm longer to make use of tuition assistance. Employee turnover is made up of 
voluntary turnover (employee quits) and involuntary turnover (dismissals and layoffs) and is 
measured by the percentage of the workforce that leaves their employer in a given year. The 
NES II does not measure employee tenure but does report both measures of turnover by 
establishment, and they are combined here into a single turnover measure.  Employers may pay 
higher wages in order to reduce turnover, but the hypothesis presented above suggests that 
workers will stay longer to make use of tuition assistance and predicts that turnover should be 
lower even independent of higher wages.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
given the sample size of 963, there are a reasonable number of such observations per independent 
variable. 
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There is a large literature on employee turnover using the individual as the unit of 
analysis, but there is not a large literature to use as a guide in modeling employee turnover at the 
employer level.  Cappelli and Neumark (2001) build such a model, and it is the basis for the 
analysis here.  
(10) I estimate a model of employee turnover of the following form: Turni = α + Tiβ + 
Xiγ + εI    where average annual turnover (Turn) is regressed against the incidence of 
tuition assistance and a vector of control variables that includes industry and 
manufacturing sector, size, average education levels, the distribution of employees across 
occupational categories, the percentage of women and the percentage of minorities, union 
coverage, and average wages, a factor seen as crucial in many prior studies of turnover.   
Additional control variables found useful in the Cappelli and Neumark (2001) study -- 
on-the-job training (average time to become proficiency), the extent of teamwork, the amount of 
time needed to fill a typical vacancy, the number of candidates interviewed (measures of 
recruiting selectiveness), and the use of “benchmarking” as a technique to learn best practices 
from other organizations – are added as well.  These variables are described in Table 2.  Because 
turnover is measured as a percentage and, in some establishments, turnover rates are at or near 
zero, I use Tobit estimation techniques to correct for possible left-censoring of the data.  
Table 6 Here 
 The results presented in Table 6 find a negative relationship between tuition assistance 
plans and employee turnover in all of the specifications. (Column 2 examines the equation 
without wages to see whether the relationships change: we know from prior research that wages 
drive turnover and from the results in Table 5 that wages covary with the incidence of tuition 
plans.)  Analyses conducted separately for voluntary turnover and involuntary turnover, available 
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on request, indicate that the relationships with tuition are always negative and strongly 
significant for involuntary turnover regardless of specification; the relationships for voluntary 
turnover, in contrast, while always negative, are more sensitive to specification.  The overall 
pattern of results suggests that tuition assistance plans are associated with lower rates of turnover 
even independent of any wage effects.  While self-selection arguments may cause employers to 
raise wages to reduce turnover, there is also evidence for a simple efficiency wage-type 
explanation, that employees stay longer to use the tuition assistance. 
 Alternative Interpretations: In all analyses, there is the possibility that other factors 
omitted from the model are explaining the results, omitted variables that are correlated with both 
the dependent variable and the relevant independent variables. Because there are no other 
systematic studies of tuition assistance plans, it is difficult to generate a list of what practices and 
policies might be correlated with them and with the independent variables above. Two may be 
worth investigation, however.  The first, which relates only to the turnover results, questions 
whether some form of back-loaded or deferred compensation is the true cause of lower turnover 
for establishments that use tuition assistance.  Under this explanation, employers who use tuition 
assistance also back-load compensation as a way to retain employees.  Employers still have to be 
earning a return on the tuition investment in order to have an incentive to retain these workers 
because back-loading compensation per se does not generate a margin.12  But it would represent 
an alternative to the efficiency wage argument that workers are staying in order to use the tuition 
assistance benefit.   
                                                          
12 Workers will obviously not remain if an employer holds their wages below market levels and then 
simply pays back the difference (or worse some fraction) in the future.  If the argument is that employers 
hold down wages while tuition assistance is being used and then later pay workers the marginal product 
of their education, this is identical to the apprenticeship model described earlier.  For the reasons noted 
there, it seems virtually impossible to use with tuition assistance.   
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We can and do test the back-loaded compensation hypothesis empirically.  While it is 
very difficult to establish the extent to which wages in any context are back-loaded, the most 
obvious form of such arrangements are pension plans.  Is it the case that employers who use 
tuition assistance plans also use pension plans? The data used here do include whether 
establishments had pension plans.  It would of course be helpful to know the details about these 
plans, information that is unfortunately not available.  The correlation between having tuition 
assistance plans and pension plans is only 0.05, however.  And when pensions are added to the 
turnover equation, the results are unchanged.13  
 A second alternative hypothesis, which relates to the wage and turnover results, questions 
whether employers who use tuition assistance are also making greater investments in training.  If 
so, training could be causing wages to be higher (rent sharing) and employees to stay longer 
(match quality).  The argument that training and education may be complements in terms of 
generating productivity is well-established, but it is not so obvious that employers care about the 
source of education when making investments in training: specifically, why would they invest 
more in training when education was provided by tuition assistance programs as opposed to 
when employees paid for it themselves? 
Nevertheless, we can also test this hypothesis. The NES data includes a measure of 
average hours of training per year for each establishment.  Its correlation with the incidence of 
tuition assistance in these data is actually negative, -0.16, suggesting the reasonable 
interpretation that the postsecondary education provided through tuition plans might be a 
                                                          
13 I estimated various turnover models including the pension variable.  When included with other 
employee benefits, for example, the pension coefficient was –0.28 and S.E. 5.84.  In all cases, the tuition 
assistance variable remained strongly significant, never less than: coefficient –2.9 and S.E.=1.5. 
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substitute for at least some employer-provided training.14  Including training does not change the 
relationships with tuition assistance in any important way in the wage or turnover equations.15  
A final, alternative explanation for these results turns not on potential omitted variables 
but a different explanation for the employee responses to tuition assistance.  Could it be a “gift 
exchange” (Akerlof 1981) in the sense that the tuition assistance benefits are seen by employees 
as a gift that generates a sense of obligation on their part and, in turn, leads to greater 
attachment/lower turnover?  Because such an explanation turns on how workers interpret this 
benefit and what is going on inside their heads, it is essentially impossible to test it or 
differentiate it empirically from more rational self-interest explanations without very 
sophisticated experimental data.  But there are logical grounds for thinking that tuition assistance 
is unlikely to generate much of a gift-exchange response.  First, if an employer truly wanted to 
generate reciprocity-based loyalty through some gift exchange, they would choose a mechanism 
that looks more like a gift: Tuition assistance involves considerable effort and initiative on the 
part of the worker, unlike virtually all other benefits.  It is also common enough that it is less 
likely to be seen as unusual – if it is typical and expected, can it be a gift? – and cannot be used 
                                                          
14  The training variable retained a negative sign, although rarely significant, in preliminary models 
estimating the incidence of tuition assistance. There may be good institutional reasons for a negative 
relationship between training and tuition assistance. Under the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act, employers 
who require that their covered employees (so-called “non-exempt” workers) receive training – even 
general skills training where the employee benefits -- must pay the full costs of such training, including 
the wages of those being trained.  Employers can avoid that requirement by encouraging their workers to 
take skills training in the form of course work at colleges through tuition support.  In this case, the 
employer may only be paying a portion of the tuition and other direct costs of these courses, and 
employees may be attending classes and doing homework on their own time.  The employee’s share of 
the investment is therefore much greater. Presumably employers could offer optional training in house 
and ask the employees to pay, but it may be less complicated to essentially outsource the operation and 
make it appear more like a benefit and less like a cost. It may also be cheaper to essentially outsource 
some skills training to colleges, especially community colleges and state-supported institutions where 
tuition and other direct costs are substantially subsidized through taxes. 
15 The tuition coefficient in the wage equation falls trivially but retains the same level of significance ( 
0.52 S.E.=0.22).  In the turnover equation, the tuition coefficient becomes slightly larger and trivially 
more significant (-4.42 S.E. = 2.07). 
 32
until an employee has already put in some time in the organization. Employees also know about 
it when they sign on with the employer.  Second, if tuition assistance could indeed generate this 
sense of loyalty, then presumably so would every other employee benefit including virtually 
everything that employers do for employees.  If so, then there would be no unique behavior 
associated with tuition assistance.  “Gift exchange” if it existed would simply be an attribute of 
being employed.  
 
Conclusion: 
 Although the results of the above analyses are perhaps more suggestive than definitive of 
an answer as to why employers provide tuition assistance to their employees, they point to some 
reasonably clear conclusions.  Employers must generate the resources to pay for these plans 
somehow.  The institutional evidence suggesting how these plans work in practice makes it 
difficult to believe that wages are artificially held down while employees use them.  And the 
evidence of wage premia associated with their use conflicts with the simple explanation that 
tuition assistance is paid for by holding wages below market levels through apprenticeship or 
training wage arrangements.  Instead, the results appear more consistent with the view that 
workers who use tuition assistance have productivity that is above market levels. One reason for 
their greater productivity might be their better quality when hired, as the above results indicate. 
Employers can therefore pay the market wage and still earn a margin to recoup tuition assistance 
costs, although exactly why they are paying a wage premium remains something of a puzzle for 
future research.  Turnover is lower, even independent of wage premia, and that result seems 
consistent with the view that workers stay with firms longer in order to make full use of tuition 
assistance plans.  The fact that turnover is lower helps the employer pay for tuition benefits by 
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earning a margin longer.  Lower turnover in itself is a source of cost savings for employers by 
reducing search and hiring costs. 
The fact that tuition assistance plans appear to be so common raises the question as to 
whether effective self-selection can be going on. One shortcoming of the data used here is that it 
only captures whether employer have tuition assistance and not the characteristics of what they 
offer. There is considerable and important variation across these plans with respect to how well 
they support employee education, as the descriptive data presented earlier suggests. Some meet 
only a fraction of the costs and are limited to a narrow range of job-specific courses while others 
cover virtually the entire cost of post secondary education, even for degrees unrelated to current 
jobs.  As a practical matter, therefore, worker self-selection may be driven by the characteristics 
of plans and not simply whether an employer has one.  If every employer had identical plans, of 
course, there would be no selection effects, although it might still make sense to have tuition 
assistance.  They could represent an equilibrium employment condition, much like a market 
wage, that would make an employer stand out in a negative way if they did not offer them. 
Important questions for further research include examining how characteristics of tuition 
reimbursement plans affect the outcomes noted here and differentiating more clearly the source 
of benefit from these plans to employees.  
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Table 1: 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Tuition Reimbursement 
  
                     Mean     Std. Deviation        
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
size  
Less than 50                          | .854           .354            
50 - 99                                |  .821           .384            
100 – 249                             |  .886           .319            
250 - 999                              |  .827           .378            
1,000 or more                         |  .857           .351            
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Industry 
       Food(20) & Tobacco(21)            |  .639           .487             
       Textile(22) & Apparel(23)              |  .651           .482            
       Lumber(24) & Paper(26)                |  .721           .452            
       Printing & Publishing(27)              |  .727           .448            
       Chemicals(28) & Petroleum(29)         |  .842           .367            
       Primary metals(33)                     |  .781           .416            
       Fabricated metals(34)                 |  .882           .325             
       Machinery & Inst.(35,36,38)            |  .885            .32            
       Machinery & Inst.(35,36,38)            |  .882           .325             
       Other & Misc. Man.(25,30,31,32)       |  .897           .306            
       Construction(15-17)                   |  .842           .366            
       Transport. svcs.(42,45)                |  .808           .397            
       Communication(48)                     |  .875           .336            
       Utilities(49)                           |  .836           .373            
       Wholesale trade(50,51)                 |  .933           .252            
       Retail trade(52-59)                   |  .905           .295             
       Finance(60-62)                         |  .864           .347            
       Insurance(63,64)                       |  .881           .326            
       Hotels(70)                             |  .973           .164            
       Business svcs.(73)                     |  .972           .167            
       Health Services(80)                   |  .853           .359            
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Sector 
   Manufacture                  |  .865           .342     
Non-manufacture                 .|  .809           .393     
 
 
 
 
Correlation between Tuition Reimbursement, Manufacturing, And Size 
(obs=1494) 
 
           |  Tuition      Manufacturing  Size 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Tuition   |   1.0000 
 Manufacturing |   0.0737    1.0000 
 Size     |  -0.0018    .0193        1.0000 
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Table 2: 
Variables, Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Variable                                                                                   Obs           Mean     Std. Dev.        
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Tuition assistance 
  Whether reimburse tuition for approved courses                   1511         .88           .36       
Education level   
  Average schooling for all employees                                    1687       12.75        1.05     
  Average schooling for employees   
    hired in the last two years                                                     463       13.28         1.13    
Average number of training hours                                           1024       32.40       43.63 
    each employee received last year 
Work organization 
  Months to become fully proficient                                        2696        7.42        10.76              
  Percentage of employees in self-managed teams                  2928      16.10        29.86              
  Percentage of employees in job rotation                               2935      20.04        31.11             
  Levels between bottom and top officials                               2903       2.58          2.67      
Whether contribute to a pension plan                                      2955         .77            .42              
 
Average salary                                                                         1420    31815.69    10282.8    
Percentage of permanent workforce left  
    voluntarily last year                                                             2799    15.37           22.45             
Average hours worked per week                                             1742    43.93             4.48          
Percentage of employees covered  
    by a collective-bargaining agreement                                 2943    20.26        36.35       
Number of employee benefit types                                         2855      6.97          1.94            
Number of weeks to fill a typical   
    production employee’s job opening                                    2693      3.19         3.13              
Number of candidates interviewed for each  
    production employee’s job opening                                    2557      6.71         8.29               
Whether undergone re-engineering within 
    the past three years                                                              2934        .38            .49              
Importance of education criteria in employee  
    selection (the highest possible scale is 5)                            2736      2.56           .82 
Percentage of employees involved in regular meetings  
    to discuss work-related issues                                             2898     57.00       42.89   
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 
 
OLS Estimates of Educational Attainment as a Function of Tuition Assistance   
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
                                                          (1)                                   (2) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________    
 
tuition assistance     .151 (.078)*    .128 (.089)    
supervisors      .007 (.008)          .003 (.008) 
technical      -.016 (.007)*        -.015 (.007)* 
clerical      -.024 (.008)**      -.022 (.006)** 
production workers    -.025 (.008)**      -.024 (.006)** 
% women     .001 (.001)        -.001 (.002) 
% minority    -.004 (.002)*      -.003 (.002)* 
new hire ed     .588 (.136)**          .592 (.095)** 
constant                         6.90 (2.37)**  6.65 (1.69)** 
Ind_type                 not included                             included  
size      not included                             included  
sector      not included                             included  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Number of observations       411                          411 
R - Squared                       .663                                   .71 
 ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  * t-statistics 5% significant 
** t-statistics 1% significant 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
OLS Estimates of Educational Levels of New Hires 
 as a Function of Tuition Assistance   
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    
              (1)        (2) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________                                      
tuition assistance     .354 (.140)**    .225 (.123)^ 
supervisors     -.001 (.011)         .002 (.010)    
technical       -.008 (.008)       -.008 (.009)   
clerical         -.018 (.007)**       -.015 (.008)^   
production workers    -.038 (.006)**      -.029 (.006)**    
women      .001 (.002)         .00008 (.003)   
minorities    -.004 (.002)*          -.003 (.002)    
recruit-cost      .023 (.008)**         .022 (.012)^     
constant     15.40 (.577)**  -3.44 ( .069)**   
Ind_type                 not included            included 
size      not included           included 
sector      not included           included 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Number of observations           322                        322    
R - Squared      .4377  .5674    
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  * t-statistics 5% significant 
** t-statistics 1% significant 
^ t-statistics 10% significant 
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Table 5: 
 
OLS Wage regressions as a Function of Tuition Assistance 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
                                              (1)                    (2) 
OLS Wage Regressions as a   Probit Estimates of Tuition Assistance 
       Function of Tuition Assistance            as a Function of Wage Premium 
_______________________________________________________________________________________    
 
tuition assistance   .055 (.021)**    …  
education    .111 (.008)**    .194 (.062)** 
work-hours   .015 (.002)**          … 
all-benefits   .026 (.005)**     .119 (.037)** 
sales   7.56e-11 (2.87e-11)**  … 
union    .001 (.0002)**   -.005 (.001)** 
%women    -.004 (.0004)**   … 
%minorities    .00004 (.0003)   … 
constant    8.28 (.14)**   -2.29 (.825)** 
wage premium  …    .687 (.2567)** 
Ind_type            included                             included  
size             included                             included  
sector               included                            included  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No. of obs.   985    969                           
R- Squared  .5639     … 
Pseudo R2   …    0.1255 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  * t-statistics 5% significant 
** t-statistics 1% significant 
^ t-statistics 10% significant 
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Table 6 
 
Tobit Estimates of Employee turnover as a Function of Tuition Assistance   
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
                                            (1)                  (2)    (3) 
___________________________________________________________________________________    
 
tuition assistance -4.25 (2.01)*   -3.82 (1.87)*   -3.49 (2.09)^ 
education  -1.17 (.946)  -3.28 (.837)**   -2.09 (1.00)* 
ln(pay)  -17.54 (2.88)**             …   -13.80 (3.37)** 
supervisors -.190 (.173)         -.082 (.160)    -.246 (.185) 
technical   -.088 (.107)        -.073 (.099)   -.086 (.109) 
clerical   -.296 (.118)*       -.221 (.110)*   -.327 (.122)** 
productionworkers -.127 (.095)      -.070 (.086)   -.158 (.098) 
%women    .058 (.036)         .137 (.038)**   .044 (.045) 
%minorities  -.095 (.030)**         .086 (.028)**   .073 (.031)* 
proficient  …   …   -.076 (.061) 
recruit-time  …   …  -.391 (.267) 
#candidates  …   …  .014 (.100) 
team   …   …  -.009 (.025) 
benchmarking  …   …  -.377 (1.51) 
union   …   …  -.038 (.021)^ 
constant   227.77 (31.15)**  65.05 (15.74)**  203.35 (36.27)**  
Ind_type            …            included                           included  
size     …           included                           included  
sector     …           included                           included  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No. of obs.  1110   1336   1029                          
Pseudo R2 .0127   .0152   .0189  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  * t-statistics 5% significant 
** t-statistics 1% significant 
^ t-statistics 10% significant 
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Appendix:  Correlation Matrix 
 
                     |  tuition    meetings      proficient     team     rotation      levels   work-hours 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 tuition    |   1.0000 
 meetings    |  -0.0639   1.0000 
 proficient   |   0.0676   0.1291   1.0000 
 team            |   0.0274   0.2301   0.0501   1.0000 
 rotation    |   0.0210   0.2054  -0.0148   0.1222   1.0000 
 levels    |   0.0669   0.0396   0.0097   0.0311  -0.0732   1.0000 
 work-hours    |  -0.0993   0.0738   0.0257   0.2108   0.1004  -0.0413   1.0000 
 union    |  -0.0742  -0.1073   0.0172  -0.1552  -0.0371  -0.0001   0.0729 
 re-engineering   |   0.1241  -0.0020   0.0095   0.0616   0.0665   0.0318   0.1647 
 benchmarking    |   0.0561   0.0108   0.1054   0.1420   0.1377   0.0885  -0.0029 
 skill-up     |   0.0563   0.0360   0.1200   0.1083   0.0032  -0.0802   0.0880 
 skill-down    |  -0.1483  -0.0585  -0.0535   0.0217  -0.0011  -0.0267   0.0592 
 training     |  -0.1611   0.1448  -0.0011   0.2190   0.1429   0.0301   0.2363 
 lnpay    |   0.1714  -0.0026   0.1958   0.0595  -0.1611   0.0088   0.3755 
 pension      |   0.0534  -0.0437  -0.1080   0.0190   0.0704   0.0325   0.0075 
 profit     |  -0.0311  -0.0037  -0.1100   0.0680   0.1490   0.0158   0.1908 
 benefits    |   0.0914   0.1400   0.0151   0.0987   0.0872  -0.0038   0.0909 
 turnover     |  -0.0957  -0.0877  -0.1116  -0.1042   0.0849  -0.0266  -0.0560 
 recruit-time    |   0.1464   0.1266   0.2772  -0.0205  -0.0688   0.0445   0.0179 
 candidates    |  -0.0584  -0.0189  -0.0106   0.0606   0.0714  -0.0545   0.0416 
 education    |   0.0536  -0.0040   0.0750   0.0563  -0.0762  -0.0095   0.0812 
 recruit-cost   |  -0.0804  -0.1043  -0.0300   0.0243   0.0318   0.0353  -0.0154 
 women    |  -0.0061  -0.0823  -0.1740   0.0756   0.0436  -0.0633  -0.3934 
 minorities    |  -0.1778  -0.1243  -0.1529  -0.1199   0.0876  -0.0421   0.0823 
 managers    |   0.0688  -0.1138   0.0227  -0.0016  -0.1429   0.0919   0.0070 
 supervisors    |  -0.1293  -0.0793   0.1021   0.0383  -0.1118  -0.0005  -0.0017 
 technical    |   0.1143   0.0141   0.1567  -0.0078  -0.1444  -0.0023  -0.1494 
 clerical     |   0.0396  -0.0891   0.0635  -0.0419  -0.0982   0.0230  -0.1375 
 workers     |  -0.0782   0.1067  -0.1476   0.0205   0.2103  -0.0476   0.1533 
 schooling    |   0.1683   0.0472   0.1168   0.0961  -0.1424   0.0551  -0.0050 
 schooling-new   |   0.1791   0.0260   0.0906   0.0901  -0.0865  -0.0124  -0.0202 
 sector     |   0.0641  -0.0248   0.0689   0.1025   0.1823   0.0505   0.2356 
   size    |   0.0233  -0.1691  -0.0721  -0.0328  -0.0526  -0.0759   0.0367 
 
 
                    union     re-engineering     benchmarking     skill-up     skill-down  training    lnpay 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
union   |   1.0000 
re-engineering  |   0.0587   1.0000 
benchmarking  |   0.0714   0.0741   1.0000 
skill-up   |   0.0120   0.1793   0.1545   1.0000 
skill-down  |   0.0144  -0.0105  -0.0055  -0.2015   1.0000 
training   |   0.0212   0.0013  -0.0232   0.0807  -0.0231   1.0000 
lnpay   |   0.1440   0.0612   0.1473   0.2224  -0.0558  -0.0063   1.0000 
pension   |   0.1898   0.1385   0.0428   0.0663  -0.0503   0.0928   0.0635 
profit    |   0.0423   0.1612   0.1344   0.0197   0.0280   0.0775   0.0983 
benefits   |   0.0549   0.1301   0.1955   0.1103   0.0035   0.1058   0.1832 
turnover    |  -0.0772  -0.0364  -0.1315  -0.0801   0.3025  -0.0697  -0.2698 
recruit-time  |   0.0827   0.0719   0.1003   0.1518  -0.0935   0.0463   0.3435 
candidates  |   0.0671   0.0733   0.0302   0.1092  -0.0181   0.2663   0.1334 
education   |  -0.0067   0.0297   0.0784   0.1377   0.1299   0.0611   0.1628 
recruit-cost  |  -0.1058   0.0053  -0.0210  -0.0122  -0.0209   0.0752  -0.0443 
women       |  -0.2959  -0.0578   0.0544   0.0083   0.0529  -0.0608  -0.4106 
minorities  |   0.0043  -0.0419  -0.0805  -0.0762  -0.0244   0.0883  -0.1284 
sectoragers  |  -0.1569  -0.0399   0.0422   0.1027   0.0697  -0.0210   0.2718 
supervisors  |  -0.0757  -0.0001  -0.0647   0.0615  -0.0170   0.0445   0.2819 
technical   |  -0.1625   0.0149   0.0598   0.1108  -0.0642  -0.0165   0.2203 
clerical    |  -0.0896  -0.0525   0.0278   0.1088  -0.0234  -0.0448   0.0422 
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workers    |   0.2117   0.0386  -0.0481  -0.1728   0.0229   0.0326  -0.3036 
schooling   |  -0.1925   0.0591   0.0694   0.1641  -0.1081  -0.0296   0.4960 
schooling-new  |  -0.1577   0.0136   0.0819   0.1076  -0.1065   0.0435   0.4520 
sector   |   0.1699   0.0675   0.0045  -0.1039   0.0066   0.0529   0.0194  
size   |   0.2262   0.1318   0.0708   0.0764  -0.0603  -0.0872   0.0693 
 
   
 
 
        |     pension     profit    benefits   turnover      recruit-time      candidates    education 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pension   |   1.0000 
profit    |   0.0355   1.0000 
benefit   |   0.2024   0.0442   1.0000 
turnover   |  -0.0319  -0.0800  -0.0496   1.0000 
recruit-time  |   0.1201   0.0014   0.2031  -0.2368   1.0000 
candidates  |   0.1252   0.0230   0.0978  -0.0488   0.1253   1.0000 
education   |   0.0256   0.0248  -0.0232  -0.0983   0.0930   0.1547   1.0000 
recruit-cost  |   0.1185   0.0316   0.1050   0.1303   0.0168   0.0817   0.0037 
women   |   0.0285  -0.0659  -0.0262   0.1346  -0.1385   0.0301   0.0146 
minorities  |  -0.0962  -0.0631  -0.1917   0.1501  -0.1214  -0.0067  -0.1573 
managers   |  -0.0773   0.0512   0.0393   0.0113   0.0773   0.0233   0.0753 
supervisors  |   0.0912  -0.0500   0.1356  -0.0481   0.1145   0.0218   0.0783 
technical   |   0.0787  -0.0560   0.0177  -0.0732   0.2884   0.0769   0.0961 
clerical   |   0.1768  -0.0366   0.0890  -0.1150   0.0990   0.1550  -0.0037 
workers   |  -0.1336   0.0410  -0.1065   0.1106  -0.2586  -0.1433  -0.0928 
schooling   |   0.1327   0.1163   0.2314  -0.2753   0.3732   0.0915   0.1814 
schooling-new  |   0.1047   0.1191   0.2551  -0.1357   0.3121   0.1174   0.1284 
sector   |  -0.0184   0.0447  -0.0906  -0.1009  -0.1319  -0.1221  -0.0475 
size   |   0.0825   0.0778   0.2026  -0.0633   0.0498  -0.0029  -0.0126 
 
           |      recruit-cost    women    minorities   managers   supervisors   technical   clerical 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
recruit-cost  |   1.0000 
women   |   0.1311   1.0000 
minorities  |   0.1698   0.0963   1.0000 
managers   |   0.1273   0.1385  -0.0662   1.0000 
supervisors  |   0.1124   0.0075  -0.0207   0.2366   1.0000 
technical   |  -0.0594   0.1172  -0.0976   0.1287   0.2120   1.0000 
clerical   |   0.2029   0.1925   0.0453   0.0879   0.1100  -0.0033   1.0000 
workers   |  -0.1631  -0.2267   0.0528  -0.5550  -0.4866  -0.5986  -0.6419 
schooling   |   0.0801   0.1090  -0.2023   0.4908   0.4222   0.4294   0.2259 
schooling-new  |   0.2009   0.1237  -0.1148   0.4081   0.3542   0.3545   0.2780 
sector   |  -0.1924  -0.3635  -0.0052  -0.1127  -0.2263  -0.3005  -0.2976 
size   |   0.0665   0.0368   0.0182  -0.1071  -0.0251  -0.0868  -0.0639 
 
          |   workers   schooling   schooling-new      sector     size 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
workers   |   1.0000 
schooling   |  -0.6323   1.0000 
schooling-new  |  -0.5779   0.7528   1.0000 
sector   |   0.4196  -0.2422  -0.3166   1.0000 
size   |   0.1280   0.0422  -0.0017   0.0875   1.0000 
 
 
 
 
